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THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE
John Quigley*
I. INTRODUCTION
The presumption of innocence has received renewed attention in
the Soviet Union in recent years as part of an effort to improve the
quality of criminal justice. This effort is associated with the Soviet
government's perestroika (restructuring) policy, which includes the
aim of ensuring fairer treatment of the citizenry in the courts. It is
also in part a product of the increasing openness (glasnost') that has
led to press articles criticizing the courts.1 The current effort builds
on a strong doctrinal development of the concept of presumption of
innocence that began following World War II.
In the Western literature, the presumption of innocence in the
U.S.S.R. has met with varied assessment. There is disagreement as
to the existence of a presumption of innocence in Soviet law and, if it
exists, as to its scope and function.
The Soviet system of criminal procedure presents several
problems when comparing its presumption of innocence with that of
common law procedure. The Soviet indictment is based on a stan-
dard of proof higher than that of probable cause; this creates diffi-
culty in maintaining a presumption of innocence at trial. Second, the
court in a Soviet trial, as will be indicated below, takes an active part
in eliciting evidence. This function may make it difficult for judges to
presume an accused to be innocent.
In 1978, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court made a major declaration
about the presumption of innocence. That declaration, which has
major implications for the role of the presumption in Soviet law, has
not been analyzed in detail. The declaration indicates a scope for the
presumption of innocence that in some respects is broader than that
of the presumption in the common law world.
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This article analyzes the status and meaning of the presumption
of innocence in Soviet law, the differing interpretations of the Soviet
presumption in the Western literature, current efforts in the
U.S.S.R. to use the presumption for reform of criminal trials, and
possible lessons for common law countries from the Soviet experience
with the presumption.
II. EXISTENCE OF A PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN SOVIET
LAW
In most common law and civil law jurisdictions, a presumption
of innocence is said to exist at criminal trials, although typically it is
not expressed in constitutions or legislation.2 Soviet jurists find a pre-
sumption of innocence in Soviet law. A leading Soviet proceduralist,
V. M. Savitskii, declaring that a presumption of innocence is firmly
established in Soviet law, castigates "bourgeois Sovietologists like
George Fletcher, who denies the existence in the U.S.S.R. of a pre-
sumption of innocence, or like Harold Berman, in whose opinion
'Soviet law does and does not contain the doctrine of presumption of
innocence.' "' Fletcher and Berman have been leading commentators
in the Western literature on the presumption of innocence in Soviet
law.
Savitskii's quotation of Berman is from a 1980 article4 in which
Berman found that the presumption plays a different role in Soviet
trials because of differences between Continental and common law
trial procedure. However, he considered it to exist in Soviet law,
albeit not the same presumption of innocence that exists in American
law.5 He wrote elsewhere: "Although the phrase 'presumption of in-
nocence' is avoided in the codes, all that American jurists generally
mean by that phrase is spelled out in Soviet law.""
2. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 530 § 2511 (Chadbourn,
rev. 1981). Draft Resolution of the Preparatory Colloquium of Vienna on the Protection of
Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, art. 1, 1978(3) Revue Internationale de Droit Pinal
589. But see Jean Patarin, Le Particularisme de la Thiorie des Preuves en Droit Pinal, in G.
STEFANI, QUELQUJES ASPECTS DE L'AUTONOMIE DU DROIT PKNAL 38 (1956) (indicating that
some French scholars view the presumption of innocence as a principle but not as a binding
norm).
3. Savitskii, Pravo na Zashchitu i Normativnoe Vyrazhenie Prezumptsii Nevinovnosti
[The Right to Defense and Statutory Expression of the Presumption of Innocence], in AD-
VOKATURA I SOVREMENNOST' [THE BAR AND THE PRESENT DAY] 25, 27 (V. Savitskii ed.
1987).
4. Berman, The Presumption of Innocence: Another Reply, 28 AM. J. COMP. L 615
(1980).
5. Id. at 622-23.
6. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 71 (1963). Accord Berman, Introduction 82,
[Vol. 29
SOVIET PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Savitskii's citation to Fletcher is to a 1968 article.' Fletcher
there did not state that a presumption of innocence does not exist in
Soviet law. He said that the matter was disputed among Soviet ju-
rists, that its status in Soviet law was uncertain, but that certain
aspects of the presumption do exist in Soviet criminal procedure leg-
islation.' In a 1984 article, he took a similar position.' The dominant
opinion in both the Western and Soviet literature is that a presump-
tion of innocence is found in Soviet law. 10
A. Early Rejection of the Presumption of Innocence
During the period immediately following the 1917 Russian
Revolution, the doctrine of dictatorship of the proletariat prevailed,
and some jurists viewed the presumption of innocence as weighing
too strongly in favor of the accused and against the state." Thus, V.
S. Tadevosian argued against proponents of the presumption that by
"placing on the shoulders of the state . . . the burden of proving the
crime, freeing the accused of any obligations, proposing to construe
any doubt to the benefit of the accused and to convict no one until
the crime is proved like two times two equals four," they "eloquently
in H. BERMAN & J. SPINDLER, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR
CODES (1966). Id. at 59. Berman notes that a key component of the presumption of inno-
cence-the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proof-functions differently in Conti-
nental procedure than in common law procedure, since in Continental procedure the court,
rather than the prosecutor, plays the primary role in questioning witnesses. H. BERMAN, JUS-
TICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra, at 399.
7. Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Union, 15 UCLA L. REV.
1203 (1968).
8. Id. at 1216-22.
9. Fletcher, The Ongoing Soviet Debate about the Presumption of Innocence, 3 CRIM.
Jus. ETHICS 69, 70 (1984).
10. Osakwe, Modern Soviet Criminal Procedure: A Critical Analysis, 57 TUL. L. REV.
439, 538 (1983); W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 317 (1983); GorlE, Criminal Law, in THE DIS-
TINCTIVENESS OF SOVIET LAW 227, 263 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1987); Savitskii, Predislovie [In-
troduction], in C. KASUMOV, PREZUMPTSIIA NEVINOVNOSTI V SOVETSKOM PRAVE [THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN SOVIET LAW] 3, 4 (1984) ("Now no one tries openly to
deny the existence in our procedure of a presumption of innocence.").
11. While the East European socialist states have followed the presumption of innocence
(see infra note 28) China did not do so during the period in which class struggle figured more
prominently than in the East European states. V. LUKASHEVICH, GARANTIi PRAV
OBVINIAEMOGO V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE [GUARANTEES OF THE RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED IN SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 42, 43 (1959). However, by the early
1980's, the issue was a matter of dispute. Gelatt, The People's Republic of China and the
Presumption of Innocence, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259, 315-16 (1982); Thieme, The
Debate on the Presumption of Innocence in the People's Republic of China, 10 REV. SOCIAL-
IST L. 277-90 (1984); SHAO-CHUAN LENG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANAL-
YSIS AND DOCUMENTS 96-98 (1985).
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defend the freedom and inviolability of the individual," but down-
play "the interests of the state and society."' 2 Tadevosian found that
"in the laws in force in the U.S.S.R., there are no previously estab-
lished presumptions of guilt or of innocence of citizens and there is
no need of any previously determined presuppositions or
presumptions. '"13
Other Soviet jurists of that period objected to a presumption of
innocence on the grounds that it was excessively formal and abstract,
linking it to the medieval system of formal proofs that had been used
in Europe. They feared that it would allow a court an easy solution
if proof-gathering in a case proved difficult. In such a case, the court
could avoid difficult issues of fact by simply declaring that there was
doubt and pronouncing a judgment of not guilty. They said, more-
over, that its meaning was unclear. 14 A prime desideratum in early
Soviet legal thought was to make the law understandable to the pub-
lic. Further, in light of its abstractness, the presumption was seen as
conflicting with the Marxist concept of the concreteness of truth."
Contributing to the rejection of the presumption of innocence
was a negative attitude toward individual rights grounded in the be-
lief that such rights were developed by capitalist societies, where they
were proclaimed to apply to all, but were realizable in fact only by
the bourgeoisie. Rights were thus viewed as more useful even in the
U.S.S.R. to the bourgeoisie than to the proletariat." Against the
backdrop of the tendency to reject rights on this basis developed an-
other tendency, which held that in Soviet society rights should be
realizable by all classes. Thus, one adherent of the presumption of
innocence said:
It is not proper to deny the principle of the presumption of in-
nocence of the accused in Soviet criminal procedure only be-
12. Tadevosian, K Voprosu ob Ustanovlenii Material'noi Istiny v Sovetskom Protsesse
[The Question of Establishing Material Truth in Soviet Procedure], in SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 65, 70 (No. 6 1948).
13. Id.
14. S. A. Golunskii, 0 Veroiatnosti i Dostovernosti v Sude [Probability and Certainty
in Court], in PROBLEMY UGOLOVNOI POLITIRI [IssuES IN CRIMINAL POLICY] 59 (bk. 4
1937); Tadevosian, supra note 12, at 70-71.
15. Golunskii, supra note 14, at 59. But see M. STROGOVICH, OBVINENIE I
OBVINIAEMYI NA PREDVARITEL'NOM SLEDSTVII I NA SUDE [THE ACCUSATION AND THE
ACCUSED AT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND AT TRIAL] 29-31 (1934) (stating that
the issue is not to determine whether a presumption of innocence exists as an abstract princi-
ple, but to ensure that guilt is not presumed. Further, that the burden of proof rests on the
prosecution, and that investigators seek exculpating as well as incriminating evidence).
16. Podvolotskii, Civil Liberties: A Bourgeois Deception (1923), in SOVIET POLITICAL
THOUGHT: AN ANTHOLOGY 118-20 (M. Jaworskyj ed. 1967).
[Vol. 29
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cause it was first forwarded in bourgeois criminal procedure. If
so, one would have to reject very many concepts and principles
that externally have a certain similarity with bourgeois practices
of the same name.1
B. The Emergence of a Presumption of Innocence
In the 1940's, support for a presumption of innocence grew as
the doctrine of dictatorship of the proletariat lost its hold. In 1948,
the U.S.S.R. supported the inclusion of a provision on presumption
of innocence in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
By the late 1950's, a consensus on the issue had emerged, spurred by
a desire to strengthen rights as a counterweight to abuses of rights
witnessed in the 1930's and 1940's.'9
When new criminal procedure legislation was drafted in the
late 1950's, some proponents of the presumption tried to expressly
write it into the legislation.20 They were defeated by others who ar-
gued not that the presumption was inappropriate for Soviet law, but
that its meaning was unclear, in part because it did not translate
well into Russian. They contended, therefore, that it was better to
spell out the ingredients of the presumption rather than to use a
"declaratory formula" that might not be understood.2 1 Some, like the
17. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 45-46.
18. Petrukhin, Prezumptsiia Nevinovnosti-Konstitutsionnyi Printsip Sovetskogo
Ugolovnogo Protsessa, in SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PPAVO [SOVIET STATE AND LAW] 18,
19 (No. 12, 1978); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11(1), G.A. Res. 217 (Dec.
10, 1948).
19. A. M. LARIN, PREZUMPTSIIA NEVINOVNOSTI [PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE] 27
(1982); V. KAMINSKAIA, UCHENIE O PRAVOVYKH PREZUMPTSIIAKH V UGOLOVNOM PROT-
SESSE [A STUDY OF LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 100-01 (1948) (finding
a presumption of innocence in Article 111 -right to defense-of the 1936 Constitution and in
various provisions of the 1923 Russian criminal procedure code).
20. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 46.
21. So argued by Golunskii, Novye Osnovy Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i
Soiuznykh Respublik [The New Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR
and Union Republics], in SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE AND LAW] 50,
54 (No.2, 1959); Golunskii, Novye Osnovy Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i
Soiuznykh Respublik [The New Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR
and Union Republics], in 0 NOVOM OBSHCHESOIUZNOM ZAKONODATEL'STVE PO
UGOLOVNOMY PRAVU, PROTSESSU I SUDOUSTROISTVU [THE NEW ALL-UNION LEGISLATION
ON CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE, AND COURT STRUCTURE] 63-64 (1959); Golunskii, Voprosy
Dokazatel'stvennogo Prava v Osnovakh Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSR i
Soiuznykh Respublik [Issues of Evidence Law in the Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Procedure of the USSR and Union Republics], in VOPROSY SUDOPROIZVODSTVA I SUDOUS-
TROISTVA V NovoM ZAKONODATEL'STVE SOIUZA SSR [ISSUES OF COURT PROCEDURE AND
COURT STRUCTURE IN THE NEW LEGISLATION OF THE USSR] 122, 135 (S. Golunskii ed.
1959); M. L. IAKUB, DEMOKRATICHESKIE OSNOVY SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNO-PROTSS-
1989]
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proceduralist Trusov, argued against its inclusion on principle.
Trusov used the example of a person caught in the act of committing
a crime and said that one could not consider him innocent. 22
In any event, the legislation of 1958-196028 included "guaran-
tees expressing the presumption of innocence but did not contain the
formula 'presumption of innocence' as such and did not use that
term." '24 It incorporated those postulates generally considered to ex-
press the presumption of innocence: no proof burdens on the ac-
cused,25 conviction only on evidence presented at trial26 and no con-
viction based on supposition." Most criminal procedure codes of
East European socialist countries include explicit provisions on the
presumption of innocence.28 Consequently, Fletcher acknowledged
that the new Soviet legislation incorporated certain aspects of the
presumption,"8 but inferred from the omission that a presumption of
SUAL'NOGO PRAVA [THE DEMOCRATIC BASES OF SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 126
(1960). This argument is characterized as reflecting "snobbery" by Larin, supra note 19, at
29. See also Berman & Quigley, Comment on the Presumption of Innocence Under Soviet
Law, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1230, 1234-35 (1968).
22. A. TRUSOV, OSNOVY TEORII SUDEBNYKH DOKAZATEL'STV [FUNDAMENTALS OF
THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE] 156 (1960). Trusov, though, supported the principle in
dubio pro reo, the principle that a conviction may be based only on evidence presented at trial,
and the principle that conviction may not be based on supposition.
23. Osnovy Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva Soiuza SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik [Funda-
mental Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and Union Republics], Dec. 25, 1958,
Ved. Ver. Soy. SSSR [Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR], no. 1, item 15 (1959);
criminal procedure codes of the fifteen constituent republics, adopted circa 1960. For conve-
nience, only the code of the Russian republic is cited in this article. Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi
Kodeks RSFSR [Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR], Oct. 27, 1960, Ved. Ver. Soy.
RSFSR [Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR], No. 40, item 592 (1960) [hereinafter
RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960)].
24. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 57. lakub, supra note 21, at 126. IAKUB, for
example, opposed use of the phrase "presumption of innocence" in legislation but supported
the presumption itself. IAKUB, supra note 21, at 114. Contra K. MOKICHEV, PROTIV REVI-
ZIONISTSKIKH IZVRASHCHENII MARKSISTSKO-LENINSKOGO UCHENIIA o GOSUDARSTVE I
PRAVE [AGAINST REVISIONIST DISTORTIONS OF MARXIST-LENINIST LEARNING ON STATE
AND LAW] 34 (1959) (stating that the legislation does not contain a presumption of innocence,
that the procurator must make a finding of guilt before trial to ensure that the innocent are not
placed on trial, and that decision means that accused at trial cannot be presumed innocent).
25. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), supra note 23, at art. 20.
26. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), supra note 23, at art. 301.
27. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), supra note 23, at art. 309. Golun-
skii, Novye Osnovy, supra note 21, at 54. See also Berman & Quigley, supra note 21, at 1232-
33.
28. Poland (1969), art. 3; Czechoslovakia (1965), art. 2(2), (1974), art. 2(2); Hungary
(1973), art. 3; German Democratic Republic (1968), art. 6, (1975), art. 4; Bulgaria (1952),
art. 8, (1974), art. 14; Yugoslavia (1969), art. 3, (1976), art. 3. Such express legislative provi-
sions are less common in western Europe.
29. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1221.
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innocence "probably does not exist" in Soviet law.30
C. The Presumption of Innocence in the 1977 U.S.S.R.
Constitution
A new Constitution was adopted in the U.S.S.R. in 1977. In a
chapter on the courts in which certain individual rights are specified,
the presumption of innocence is not expressly stated. Fletcher said
this omission means that "maybe [the presumption] doesn't exist."81
However, the Constitution includes two provisions that argua-
bly incorporate the presumption. Article 158 states that the accused
has a right to defense. Article 160 states that no one can be deemed
guilty other than by a court judgment. In 1978, the U.S.S.R. Su-
preme Court, which had earlier invoked certain rules generally asso-
ciated with the presumption of innocence,3" for the first time gave an
extended interpretation of its meaning. It did so in an "explanation"
of the law.33 The Court found a presumption of innocence in the
Constitution, though it left it unclear precisely where it had found
it.34
The decree is titled "Right to Defense" and refers specifically to
only one provision of the Constitution, namely Article 158, which
guarantees a "right to defense."3 5 The Court's formulation is:
In order to ensure to the accused (or defendant) the right to
defense, courts must strictly observe the constitutional principle
that the accused (or defendant) is presumed innocent until his
30. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 70.
31. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 70.
32. See infra note 78.
33. The Court has the power to issue "explanations" outside the context of a particular
case. While not considered formal sources of law, these explanations are binding on lower
courts. Law on the Supreme Court of the USSR, art. 3, Nov. 30, 1979, Ved. Ver. Soy. SSSR
[Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR], No. 49, item 842 (1979). This provision gives
Supreme Court explanations "general normative character." S. Zivs, ISTOCHNIKI PRAVA
[SouRcES OF LAW] 184-85 (1981). "The Supreme Court of the USSR and the supreme courts
of the republics have the power to issue binding explanations of the law. They use this power
to supplement the very general provisions of the codes and other laws with detailed rules for
situations that arise frequently." 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM 55
(1987).
34. Decree No. 5, Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court, 0 Praktike Primeneniia
Sudami Zakonov, Obespechivaiushchikh Obviniaemomy Pravo na Zashchitu [On Court Prac-
tice in Applying Statutes Protecting the Right of the Accused to Defense], para. 2, BULL.
VERKH. SUDA SSSR [Bulletin of the USSR Supreme Court] 8 (No. 4, 1978) [hereinafter
USSR Supreme Court].
35. Id. para. 1; M. STROGOVICH, PRAVO OBVINIAEMOGO NA ZASHCHITU I
PREZUMPTSIIA NEVINOVNOSTI [THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNO-
CENCE] 71 (1984).
1989]
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guilt is proved in the manner provided by statutory law and is
established by a court judgment that has entered into force. 6
Since the "right to defense" is contained in Article 158, one
might conclude that it is there that the Court finds a presumption of
innocence. Yet the Court refers to the presumption as a "constitu-
tional principle." 3 This suggests that it might be located elsewhere
in the Constitution than in Article 158, but that it is subsumed as
well under the "right to defense," a kind of umbrella provision that
covers all rights available to the defense, including the Article 160
right not to be presumed guilty without a court judgment of guilt. If
the presumption is located elsewhere in the Constitution, the only
other logical choice is Article 160.
Soviet scholars find the presumption in Article 160, rather than
in Article 158.38 Moreover, a semiofficial commentary to the 1977
Constitution states that Article 160 "contains the important demo-
cratic proposition of the presumption of innocence." 9 One scholar
who finds the presumption of innocence in Article 160 believes that
the right to defense is included within the presumption of innocence,
rather than vice versa. Petrukhin states that "it makes better sense
logically" to say that "the right to defense is given to the accused or
to the suspect precisely because the statutory law does not yet pre-
sume them guilty."4
36. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 9 (para. 2).
37. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, para. 1.
38. Quigley, The Soviet Bar in Search of a New Role, 13 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 201,
207 (1988). See, e.g., Larin, supra note 19, at 101-02; Libus, Prezumptsiia Nevinovnosti i
Prekrashchenie Ugolovnykh Del (Opravdanie) [The Presumption of Innocence and the Termi-
nation of Criminal Cases (Acquittal)], in SOVETsKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAvo 62 (No. 7,
1981); I. LIBUS, PREZUMPTSIIA NEVINOVNOSTI V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE
[THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 54 (1981); Petrukhin,
supra note 18, at 18; Strogovich, Prezumptsiia Nevinovnosti i Prekrashchenie Ugolovnykh del
po Nereabilitiruiushchim Osnovaniiam [The Presumption of Innocence and Termination of
Criminal Cases on Grounds That Do Not Rehabilitate], in SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I
PRAVO [SOvIET STATE AND LAW] 70 (No. 2, 1983); Strogovich, supra note 35, at 72. But see
Fletcher, supra note 9, at 72; Gorli, supra note 10, at 263, who state that the Court found the
presumption in art. 158. See also I. MOTOVILOVKER, 0 Prezumptsii Nevinovnosti i Priznanii
Litsa Vinovnym ne inache kak po Prigovoru Suda [The Presumption of Innocence and Recog-
nizing a Person as Guilty Only by Court Judgement], in PROBLEMY PRAVOVOGO STATUSA
LICHNOSTI V UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE [ISSUES IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 57-58 (1981) (who does not find the presumption of innocence in
art. 160, though he finds it to exist in Soviet law).
39. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR; POLITIKO-PRAvovoI KOMMENTARll 378 (B. Ponomarev ed.
1982). Accord Kasumov, supra note 10, at 6.
40. Petrukhin, supra note 18, at 21.
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D. The Contemporary Status of the Presumption of Innocence
Since the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, writes one scholar,
"statements of some authors have disappeared about the so-called
'bourgeois character' of the presumption of innocence, its method-
ological frailty, and its inappropriateness for Soviet criminal
procedure."4
On the other hand, Fletcher declares that three scholars pub-
lished articles in 1979-1981 denying the existence of a presumption
of innocence in Soviet law."2 However, Fletcher relies on an account
of the three writers by Strogovich, who states that the three reject the
presumption.' But of the three writers Strogovich names, only one
rejects the presumption (V. D. Arsen'ev)."" The other two, A. P.
Guliaev and Ia. 0. Motovilovker, both state that the presumption
exists in Soviet law. Strogovich disagrees with Guliaev's view that
the presumption is not violated by pretrial diversion into a lay court,
which occurs upon a finding of guilt by the investigator and procura-
tor. " ' He objects that Motovilovker finds the presumption not in Ar-
41. Petrukhin, supra note 18, at 20. "No Soviet writer since 1968 has been known to
reject the proposition that a criminal defendant in a Soviet criminal process is presumed inno-
cent until he has been proven guilty." Osakwe, supra note 10, at 538. An exception to this
statement might have to be made for Arsen'ev, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
42. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 70.
43. Strogovich, supra note 38, at 71-73.
44. Strogovich, supra note 38, at 71; M. STROGOVICH, supra note 35, at 77-78 (both
citing Arsen'ev, K Voprosu o Prezumptsii Nevinovnosti v Svete Novoi Konstitutsii SSSR [The
Issue of the Presumption of Innocence in Light of the New USSR Constitution], in VOPROSY
POVYSHENIIA EFFEKTIVNOSTI BOR'BY S PRESTUPNOST'IU [ISSUES IN RAISING THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CRIME] 56 (1979) (Arsen'ev saying that the presump-
tion is contradicted by the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and
Union Republics, art. 2, which states that one "task" of criminal procedure is to ensure "that
no innocent person should be charged with criminal responsibility")); Strogovich, supra note
38, at 72 (citing Arsen'ev, Zakon o Verkhovnom Sude SSSR i Nekotorye Voprosy Sudebnoi
Praktiki [The Statute on the USSR Supreme Court and Certain Issues of Judicial Practice],
in RAZVITIE TEORII I PRAKTIKI UGOLOVNOGO SUDOPROIZVODSTVA V SVETE NovoGo
ZAKONODATEL'STVA 0 VERKHOVNOM SUDE SSSR, PROKURATURE SSSR I ADVOKATURE V
SSSR [DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN LIGHT
OF THE NEW LEGISLATION ON THE USSR SUPREME COURT, ON THE USSR PROCURACY,
AND ON THE BAR IN THE USSR] 18 (1981) (arguing that the defendant at trial is "not yet
guilty but already not innocent, occupying a middle position between being guilty and being
innocent")). A similar line of opposition to the presumption of innocence was taken by
Martynchik, citing art. 2 of the Fundamental Principles. They fear that if it is presumed
during trial that the accused is innocent, then there will be insufficient pressure on the procu-
rator to be absolutely "convinced" of guilt before endorsing an indictment. E. MARTYNCHIK,
GARANTII PRAV OBVINIAEMOGO V SUDE PERVOI INSTANTSII [GUARANTEES FOR THE
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT TRIAL] 78-79, 83 (1975).
45. M. STROGOVICH, supra note 35, at 78-79; Strogovich, supra note 38, at 72 (both
citing A. Guliaev, Sledovatel' v Ugolovnom Protsesse [The Investigator in Criminal Proce-
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ticle 160 of the Constitution,"' but elsewhere.47
A presumption of innocence can be said to exist in the U.S.S.R.
by one other route. In 1973, the U.S.S.R. ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.48 This treaty states: "Every-
one charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law." '49 A 1978 So-
viet statute on treaties provided for the first time in Soviet law that
''state agencies within whose competence the matters regulated by
international treaties of the U.S.S.R. fall shall ensure fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken under the treaties by the Soviet side."5
Since the U.S.S.R. is obliged under the Covenant to follow the pre-
sumption of innocence, that obligation must be carried out by the
courts. 1
dure] 93-94, 153 (1981)).
46. M. STROGOVICH, supra note 35, at 79-80; Strogovich, supra note 38, at 73 (both
citing Motovilovker, supra note 38, at 57-58).
47. Fletcher finds one other basis on which to doubt the existence of a presumption of
innocence in Soviet law. He refers to pre-trial diversion procedures, which are indicated by
criminal legislation as applying to persons who have "committed a crime," RUSSIA, CRIMINAL
CODE (1960), art. 52, and which are referred to in the literature as relief from criminal liabil-
ity on "non-rehabilitating" grounds. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 73. Fletcher says that diversion
thus involves a finding that the person committed a crime, which violates the presumption of
innocence. His view follows that of Petrukhin, who argues that a court should find the person
guilty prior to diversion. See supra note 18, at 22-25. Furthermore, Fletcher states that if there
is truly a presumption of innocence, diversion would not claim to be done on "non-rehabilitat-
ing" grounds, since there would be no need to "rehabilitate" an innocent person. Fletcher's
view here overlooks two factors. First, the cited statutory language was amended in 1981 to
remove the words suggesting that pre-trial diversion implies a finding that the person commit-
ted a crime. Strogovich, supra note 38, at 75; Ved. Ver. Sov. SSSR [Gazette of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR], No. 7, item 118 (1981). A person released on a "non-rehabilitating"
ground is not considered to have a criminal conviction. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL CODE (1960), art.
57. Second, the term "non-rehabilitating" grounds is found only in the literature, e.g., Pe-
trukhin, supra note 18, at 22, rather than in legislation. It is an infelicitous term for the
reason Fletcher indicates, but its use hardly suggests that no presumption of innocence exists,
since Petrukhin clearly finds one to exist.
48. Libus, The Presumption of Innocence and the Termination of Criminal Cases (Ac-
quittal), supra note 38, at 62; Savitskii, Novyi Etap v Osushchestvlenii Sotsialisticheskogo
Pravosudiia [A New Plateau in Socialist Justice], in SOVETSKAIA IUSTITSIIA [SovIET JUs-
TICE] 7, 9 (No. 5, 1978).
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(2), Dec. 16, 1966, en-
tered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 INT'L LEG. MAT. 368
(1967).
50. Zakon o Poriadke Zakliucheniia, Ispolneniia i Denonsatsii Mezhdunarodnykh
Dogovorov SSSR [Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of
International Treaties of the USSR], art. 21, Ved. Ver. Sov. SSSR [Gazette of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR], No. 28, item 439 (1978).
51. R. MIULLERSON, KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR I VOPROSY SOOTNOSHENIIA
MEZHDUNARODNOGO 1 NATSIONAL'NOGO PRAVA 42 (1980). That result follows under pre-
vailing interpretation as it stood prior to the 1978 statute, which held that treaties constitute
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E. The Function of the Presumption of Innocence in Soviet Law
As perceived by Soviet analysts, the presumption of innocence
provides a general protection to the accused. It also encompasses
other more specific protective norms. Savitskii views it as a "genera-
lized, integrated expression of all procedural guarantees that the law
has established to protect the lawful interests of the accused."52
Strogovich wrote of it that
the issue is not about a single, though important, procedural
norm, but about the principle of all the procedural activity di-
rectly connected with the adversary nature of the trial and the
right of the accused to defense. The entire system of criminal
procedure, the entire content of procedural relations, depends on
resolving one way or another the issue of presumption of
innocence. 53
Fletcher views the function of the presumption in Soviet law
more narrowly. He finds as the major issue a struggle for supremacy
between the courts and the prosecuting agency (procuracy). "Behind
the doctrinal moves in the debate lies buried an important institu-
tional struggle between the procuracy and the courts." '54 "The strug-
gle," he writes,
is for influence over the outcome of cases, and the contenders
are the two dominant branches of the Soviet legal system: the
procuracy and the courts . . . . The problem is whether the
procuracy's pre-trial conclusion should influence the judge's
evaluation at trial. The system is more efficient if the judge can
rely on the judgment of the procuracy as he might rely on the
judgement of an expert witness. Yet to the extent that the judi-
ciary defers to the procuracy, the trial is that much less a safe-
guard against convicting the innocent.55
III. U.S.S.R. SUPREME COURT'S READING OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Fletcher bases his conclusion that the issue is primarily a
domestic law, according to one view automatically, and according to another if they are self-
executing in character. W. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 344.
52. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 25.
53. M. STROGOVICH, Uchenie o Material'noi Istine v Ugolovnom Protsesse [Study on
Material Truth in Criminal Procedure] 227 (1947).
54. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 71.
55. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1217. Fletcher's narrow reading of the scope of the pre-
sumption and his analysis that it manifests a court-procuracy struggle is shared by GorlE,
supra note 10, at 263.
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procuracy-court struggle in part on the 1978 U.S.S.R. Supreme
Court decree on the presumption of innocence. Since that decree pro-
vides the most authoritative statement on the Soviet presumption of
innocence, its relevant language bears quoting:
In order to eliminate shortcomings in the work of the courts,
and as result of questions that have arisen in application of leg-
islation, the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R. decrees:
1. To draw the attention of the court to the fact that ensur-
ing the accused (or defendant)" the right to defense is a consti-
tutional principle and must be strictly carried out at all stages of
the criminal process as an important guarantee for establishing
truth and issuing a legally-based, well-founded, and just judg-
ment."7 Therefore the courts must observe the procedural rights
of the accused (or defendant); examine the case file fully and
objectively, viewing it from all sides; seek out circumstances not
only incriminating but exculpating the accused (or defendant),
including those mitigating and aggravating his liability; care-
fully check out whatever theories of the case there may be; and
ensure the equality of rights of participants in the trial as re-
gards presentation and examination of evidence and the making
of motions.
In accordance with Article 158 of the U.S.S.R. Constitu-
tion and Article 13 of the Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Procedure Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics,
the courts must ensure to the defendant the opportunity to de-
fend himself from the accusation preferred by all methods and
means established by statutory law. 8
2. In order to ensure to the accused (or defendant) the right
to defense, courts must strictly observe the constitutional princi-
ple that the accused (or defendant) is presumed innocent until
his guilt is proved in the manner provided by statutory law and
is established by a court judgment that has entered into force.
On the basis of the statutory law, the obligation of proving
the indictment lies on the accuser. As a consequence, it is im-
56. "Accused" (obviniaemyi) refers to a person against whom a state investigator has
filed a formal charge. When the "accused" is indicted and bound over to a court for a decision
as to whether a trial should be held, he becomes a "defendant" (podsudimyi). RUssiA, CRiMI-
NAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 46. By using both terms, the Court indicates that the
presumption of innocence applies at both the pre-trial and trial stages.
57. "Judgment" (prigovor) is the trial court's decision, including both a determination
as to guilt or innocence, and (in case of guilt) a setting of sentence.
58. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 8 (para. 1).
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permissible to impose on the accused (defendant) the proof of
his innocence. A judgment of conviction may not be based on
supposition. All doubts that cannot be eliminated must be con-
strued to the benefit of the accused (defendant). 5
Fletcher states that the Court stresses the obligation of trial
courts to guarantee the equality of rights among all participants. He
reads this statement (doubtless accurately) as an injunction that trial
courts allow the accused to exercise the rights given to it by proce-
dural law. It means, he says, that "the procuracy has no claim to
superior influence." 6
According to Fletcher, paragraph one grounds the presumption
on the right to defense.
This grounding of the presumption suggests that its function in
Soviet legal thinking is to support the aim of equalizing the role
of the procuracy and of the defense in conducting the trial. The
presumption serves this goal, it seems, by admonishing the court
not to defer to the procuracy's pretrial determination of guilt.61
This reading of the 1978 decree exaggerates the issue of
procuracy-court relations and the related issue of the evidential
weight of the indictment. As viewed by the Court, these are not the
only or main aspects of the presumption of innocence. The Court
points to a number of additional functions served by the presumption
of innocence.
A. Proof in the Manner Provided by Statutory Law
One aspect of the presumption, in the Court's view, is that guilt
must be proved "in the manner provided by statutory law." '62 This
means, says Savitskii, that "guilt must be proved only in the manner
provided by statutory law, that is, using types of evidence enumer-
ated in the statutory law and observing procedural forms indicated
by statutory law; otherwise information received may not have any
evidential weight."6 Thus, among other consequences, the presump-
tion of innocence inevitably results in a rule requiring the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence.
The rule requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was
stated more explicitly in a subsequent decree of the Court: "A court's
59. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 9 (para. 2).
60. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 72.
61. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 72.
62. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 8 (para. 1).
63. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 30 (emphasis in original).
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conclusions may not bebased on evidence obtained in violation of the
procedural rules for its collection."6" This rule was applied by the
Russian Republic Supreme Court to exclude evidence obtained in a
search during which the lay observers required by statute were not
present.6 5 The U.S.S.R. Supreme Court's inclusion of the exclusion-
ary rule within the presumption of innocence renders that rule a
constitutionally mandated one.
The rule that proof must be offered in the manner provided by
statutory law has a significance beyond that of illegally obtained evi-
dence. It imports into the presumption of innocence the entire com-
plex of statutory safeguards for the accused. The fact that an accused
is presumed innocent means that the state must observe all statutory
rules at the pretrial and trial stages, and even, as will be indicated
below, beyond the trial stage. This includes protections against co-
erced confessions,66 the right to silence, 7 the right to counsel,68 and
the quite liberal discovery rules that permit an accused to view the
prosecution's entire case, including transcripts of statements of all
witnesses who will appear at trial, at the end of the preliminary
investigation.69 It also includes, as indicated more fully below, that
the indictment carries no evidential weight.7" Thus, in effect, the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Court "constitutionalized" what had formerly
been only statutory rules governing the criminal process.
64. Decree No. 15, 0 dal'neishem Ukreplenii Zakonnosti pri Osushchestvlenii
Pravosudiia [Further Strengthening of Legality in the Administration of Justice], Dec. 5,
1986, in BIULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the
USSR] 8, 10 (No. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Decree No. 15].
65. Case of Gioev, BIULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RSFSR [Bulletin of the Supreme
Court of the RSFSRI 5 (No. 11, 1981) (cartridges found during apartment search cannot be
used as basis for conviction of unlawful weapons possession where cartridges were found by
investigator in presence of a single lay witness- statute requires two lay witnesses-and in
absence of an adult member of the suspect's household, whose presence is also required by
statute). ACCORD, NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKll KOMMENTARII UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NOGO
KODEKSA RSFSR [SCHOLARLY-PRACTICAL COMMENTARY TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE OF THE RSFSR] 100 (L. Smirnov ed.1970).
66. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL CODE (1960), art. 179 (prohibition against gaining testimony by
threat or other illegal means); RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 150 (interro-
gation may not be conducted at night); V. STREMOVSKII, UCHASTNIKI PREDVARITEL'NOGO
SLEDSTVIIA [THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION] 129 (1966).
67. V. STREMOVSKII, supra note 66, at 108, 129.
68. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), arts. 47-50. The right attaches there,
for most accused persons, only after the investigator has completed the preliminary
investigation.
69. Id., art. 201.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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B. Burden of Proof
The Court links the question of burden of proof to the pre-
sumption of innocence, stating that the burden lies on the accuser
and that the accused may not be required to prove innocence. Thus,
burden of proof is another aspect of the presumption of innocence in
Soviet law.7" "In this decree it is indicated that the rules on burden
of proof flow from the constitutional principle of presumption of
innocence. '"72
The Court's statement has a broad meaning in Soviet law. It
means that the accuser continues to bear the burden of proof, even if
the accused pleads guilty prior to or at the beginning of trial.
Whereas, in the common law system, a guilty plea leads almost au-
tomatically to a finding of guilt,7" it has no procedural significance in
Soviet law (as in Continental law generally).
Further, in Soviet law the burden of persuasion may not be
placed on the accused for any facts relevant to guilt, even those facts
raising a defense for the accused. In common law countries, practice
on this issue varies. For example, in England the accused is consid-
ered to bear the burden of persuasion on an insanity defense.7 In
many jurisdictions in the United States, the accused bears the burden
of proving excuse defenses.75 In Soviet procedure, however, the ac-
cused does not bear the burden of persuasion for any defense.7 So-
viet law does not even permit shifting to the accused those presump-
tions affecting the burden of production, as is the case in common
law countries." Thus, in Soviet law, such factual circumstances as
possession of burglar tools or of recently stolen goods do not shift to
71. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 30. lakub, supra note 21, at 114. TEORIA DOKA-
ZATEL'STV V SOVETSKOM UGOLOVNOM PROTSESSE: CHAST' OBSHCHAIA [THEORY OF Evi-
DENCE IN SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GENERAL PART) 438-39 (N. V. Zhogin ed. 1966).
Kasumov, supra note 10, at 50-62. Fletcher, Soviet Debate, supra note 9, at 74, says that
Berman views burden of persuasion as the "primary function of the presumption of inno-
cence," citing H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 59-62.
But Berman indicates four additional aspects of the presumption of innocence in Soviet law (no
inference from indictment, only evidence presented at trial to be considered, guilt may not be
assumed, no conviction unless guilt proved) H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 6, at 59.
72. A. LARIN, supra note 19, at 54-55.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
74. Woolmington v. D.P.P., 1935 A.C. 462. Mancini v. D.P.P., 1942 A.C. 1.
75. Quigley, The Need to Abolish Defenses to Crime: A Modest Proposal to Solve the
Problem of Burden of Persuasion (forthcoming).
76. Id.
77. Larin, 0 Nedopustimosti Perelozheniia Obiazannosti Dokazyvaniia na
Obviniaemogo [The Impermissibility of Transfering the Obligation of Proof to the Accused],
SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE AND LAW] 122, 123 (No. 3, 1965).
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the accused the burden of producing evidence negating the offense.7 8
Soviet scholars charge that Western countries violate the presump-
tion of innocence by placing such proof burdens on the accused.79
In a 1948 Soviet criminal case, a man named Kalinin, who was
responsible for handling cash receipts at his place of employment,
was charged with theft after substantial shortages were discovered.
The shortages were the only evidence in the prosecution's case. Kali-
nin acknowledged the shortages, but said that the money had been
stolen from him in a streetcar. He presented no evidence to substan-
tiate that claim. A trial court convicted him of theft. The Criminal
Division of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court confirmed his conviction,
stating: "Kalinin, not the state investigative agency, had to prove his
claim." 80 The full bench of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, however,
reversed the conviction. It held that the quoted statement of the
Criminal Division
not only is not based on the statutory law but seriously contra-
dicts the basic principles of Soviet criminal procedure, according
to which any accused person is considered innocent until his
guilt is proved in the manner established by statutory law. By
the content and spirit of Soviet statutory law, it is not the ac-
cused who must prove his innocence, but the agencies of accusa-
tion that must prove the correctness of the indictment.8"
The Court's 1978 statement that "on the basis of the statutory
law, the burden of proof lies on the accuser"82 is significant. When it
uses the term "accuser" (obvinitel'), the Court must be referring to
the procurator, or the "state accuser" when appearing at trial to
support an accusation.88 But statutory law is not clear on whether
78. Id.
79. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 45. Kasumov, supra note 10, at 9.
80. Case of Kalinin, Dec. 27, 1946, SUDEBNAIA PRAKTIKA VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR
[COURT PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR] 17, 19, reprinted in SBORNIK
POSTANOVLENII PLENUMA I OPREDELENIi KOLLEGII VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR Po
VOPROSAM UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA [COLLECTION OF DECREES OF THE PLENARY SESSION
AND OF RULINGS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE USSR SUPREME COURT ON ISSUES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 46-47 (1964).
81. Id. The Court uses the term "considered" (schitaetsia) in the language quoted. This
is the term typically used by Soviet writers in stating the presumption of innocence. It has led
to confusion regarding the presumption, since it connotes an actual belief. Some Soviet writers
who question the presumption of innocence argue that a prosecutor taking a case to trial can-
not "consider" the accused innocent (in the sense of an actual belief in innocence). Others
reply that the presumption of innocence does not mean an actual belief in the innocence of the
accused.
82. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 9 (para. 2).
83. Kasumov, Spravedlivost' i Realizatsiia Printsipa Presumptsii Nevinovnosti na
Praktike Justice and Effectuation in Practice of the Principle of the Presumption of Inno-
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the procurator is the sole bearer of the burden of proof. The relevant
provision of the criminal procedure statute states that "[tihe court,
procurator, investigator, and the person conducting a criminal in-
quiry shall not have the right to transfer to the accused the obliga-
tion of proof." '84 While that provision makes it clear that the burden
may not rest on the accused, it does not state precisely where it lies.
While many Soviet scholars argue that it lies on the procurator,85
certain factors make that conclusion less than obvious. In many less
serious cases, no procurator or other prosecuting official even ap-
pears. If the burden of proof lies on the procurator, who bears it
when there is no procurator?8 Further, where the procurator re-
nounces an accusation at trial, the court is obliged by statute to con-
sider whether, despite the renunciation, there is evidence to support
a conviction. In this situation, the procurator is no longer bearing a
burden of proof, but the trial nevertheless continues.8" In addition, at
a Soviet trial, statutory law requires the judge, not the procurator, to
conduct the primary questioning of witnesses, thereby taking an ac-
tive role in fact finding.
By its statement that the burden of proof lies with the accuser,
the Court must be focusing on cases in which a procurator appears
and does not renounce the accusation. Its probable aim is to heighten
the significance of the presumption of innocence. For if the court is
considered to bear part of the burden of proof, it is more difficult for
the court to maintain a presumption of innocence. It is easier for the
court to presume innocence where it is considering the evidence pas-
sively, rather than actively eliciting information.88
The problem with the Court's position, of course, is that the
court does take an active role. It does not idly observe the proceed-
ings and accept the evidence presented by others. What the Court
must be saying is that even though a court is obliged to actively elicit
evidence, it does not bear a burden of proof. In any event, it should
not be difficult to maintain a rule that the burden of proof may not
cence], SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE AND LAW] 74, 75-76 (No. 12,
1983).
84. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 20.
85. Kasumov, supra note 10, at 56. Strogovich, supra note 53, at 261-63. Strogovich,
supra note 15, at 37 (procurator is a party in what is an adversary process).
86. Berman, supra note 4, at 618.
87. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 248 ("renunciation by procura-
tor of the accusation does not free the court of its obligation to continue the trial and to decide
on general principles the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant").
88. This is a problem for all civil law countries since in civil law countries the court
takes the lead in fact-finding.
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be placed on the accused. Whether the burden of proof rests on the
procurator alone or on the procurator and the court together, the
presumption of innocence, as reflected in the cited provision of the
criminal procedure statute, does not permit transfer of any proof
burden to the accused.89
C. Standard of Proof
The Court also includes under the presumption of innocence
the rule that a judgment of conviction may not be based on supposi-
tion. This means that guilt must be proved "with exhaustive full-
ness."90 Thus, the presumption of innocence is related to a standard
of proof. This issue has been the subject of heated controversy in the
U.S.S.R. During the 1930's, the notion prevailed that "maximum
probability" was all that could be demanded.91 By the 1950's, this
was replaced by a more absolutist standard, referred to as "objective
truth."92 The latter standard was deemed more consonant with
Marxist theories of cognition9 and better geared to protecting
against unjustified convictions associated with Stalinism.94
D. In Dubio Pro Reo
Where there is doubt as to whether this standard of proof has
been met, the Court holds that an acquittal must follow. This is the
meaning of its statement that doubts as to guilt must be construed to
the benefit of the accused.95 The Court thus incorporates within the
presumption of innocence the well established civilian maxim, in
dubio pro reo.96 Savitskii finds that this aspect of the presumption of
innocence is related to the prohibition of convictions based on suppo-
sition, but that it also has a separate meaning. "The rule in dubio
pro reo," he says, "serves as an additional stimulus" to the court
"maximally, fully and precisely to clear up all circumstances of the
case, to eliminate any possible doubts in the correctness of its
89. Gorgone considers, to the contrary, that if the proof burden does not clearly rest on
the procurator, there is no presumption of innocence. Gorgone, Soviet Criminal Procedure
Legislation: A Dissenting Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMp. L. 577, 607-08 (1980).
90. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 30.
91. Golunskii, supra note 14, at 61. Tadevosian, supra note 12, at 66-68. 2 M.
CHEL'TSOV-BEBUTOV, SOVETSKn UGOLOVNYI PROTSESS 29 (1929).
92. Strogovich, supra note 53, at 101. Ginsburgs, Objective Truth and the Judicial
Process in Post-Stalinist Soviet Jurisprudence, 10 AM. J. Comp. L. 53, 60-61 (1961).
93. Ginsburgs, supra note 92, at 60.
94. Ginsburgs, supra note 92, at 60.
95. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 9 (para. 2).
96. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 32. Kasumov, supra note 10, at 70.
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conclusions."97
E. Right of Appeal
The Court also states that the presumption of innocence means
that innocence is presumed until a judgment of conviction has en-
tered into force.98 A judgment of conviction is entered into force
under Soviet law not at the time it is rendered, but only after appeals
have been heard or, if there is no appeal, when the time for filing an
appeal has expired.99 Thus, an additional aspect of the presumption
of innocence is that it protects the right of the accused to appeal a
conviction. "A convicted person is presumed guilty only after the
judgment of conviction has entered into legal force," states Savitskii,
reciting this as a consequence of the presumption of innocence.'
Judges hearing an appeal are governed by the presumption of inno-
cence and must, as a result, "carefully study the arguments raised in
the appeal" and "hear out the explanations of the accused and of the
defense attorney at oral argument."'' The appellate court is gov-
erned by the principle in dubio pro reo. Therefore, if it is not cer-
tain that the truth was established and that it showed guilt, it must
reverse.1
02
The idea that the presumption of innocence survives a judgment
of guilt is illogical, according to opponents of the presumption of
innocence, since it means that a court pronouncing a judgment of
guilty must continue to presume the person being convicted to be
innocent.' 08
F. Evidential Weight of the Indictment
Proof must be made, says the Court, only in the manner pro-
97. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 32.
98. USSR Supreme Court, supra note 34, at 9 (para. 2).
99. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 356.
100. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 35 (emphasis in original). Accord, Kasumov, supra note
10, at 107. Appeal here refers to appeal as of right. A person convicted has a right to appeal to
the next higher instance. Further review is discretionary, not a matter of right. If, as not
infrequently occurs in serious cases, the trial is held in the supreme court of a union republic,
then all review is discretionary. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 325.
101. TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at 445.
102. TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at 445. Some scholars suggest that the
presumption extends beyond the appeal stage into discretionary review and review on newly
disclosed circumstances. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 53. IAKUB, supra note 21, at
120. But see TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at 445-46, saying that after entry into
force, "the guilt of the convicted person is considered to be established."
103. Martynchik, supra note 44, at 78. Trusov, supra note 22, at 156 (quoting a 1958
statement of USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy B. S. Sharkov).
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vided by statutory law."04 Statutory law permits a court to base a
conviction only on "evidence" received in court.' 5 Types of evidence
are legislatively enumerated to include witness statements and mate-
rial evidence, but do not include the indictment or any opinion of the
prosecuting authorities.'" Thus, the statutory law prohibits attribut-
ing evidential weight to the indictment.10 7
Even prior to the 1978 decree, Fletcher viewed the presumption
of innocence issue primarily as a court-procuracy struggle in reliance
on his reading of Soviet proceduralist N. N. Polianskii. In Fletcher's
1968 article, he cites Polianskii as "the leading advocate of the view
that the pre-trial finding of guilt does displace the presumption of
innocence."' 0 8 In fact, Polianskii did not take that view. Fletcher
quotes Polianskii as follows:
It is therefore impermissible to think that the court alone de-
cides the question of guilt. Both investigator and procurator in
turn (and in the prescribed form with the appropriate conse-
quences) answer the same question and both, before they can
answer the question affirmatively, are bound to overcome every
reasonable doubt as to the suspect's innocence.'0 9
Fletcher suggests that this language means the procurator's decision
as to guilt must be accorded evidential weight at trial"0 and that by
this language Polianskii "demoted the courts and furthered the
procuracy.""'
However, Polianskii neither in this passage nor elsewhere sug-
gested that the decision of the procurator carries evidentiary weight
at trial. The fact that the procurator makes a decision as to guilt
does not imply that the court should consider that decision as evi-
dence of guilt. In the language quoted above, Polianskii did not in
fact say that the investigator and procurator answer the question of
guilt "in turn." Fletcher's translation is imprecise. The Russian term
104. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
105. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 301; RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE CODE (1923), art. 319.
106. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), arts. 68-88; RUSSIA, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE (1923), arts. 57-76.
107. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1221.
108. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1218.
109. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1219. N. POLIANSKII, VOPRosy TEORII SOVETSKOGO
UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA [ISSus IN THE THEORY OF SOVIET CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 188
(1956). The word translated by Fletcher as "suspect" at the end of the quoted language is in
fact the word "accused."
110. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1218.
111. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1219.
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means "each in his own way.""' 2 The difference is significant, be-
cause Polianskii distinguished the decisions made by the procurator
and by the court on the basis of the procedural function of each.
Polianskii so indicated in a footnote he appended to the quoted lan-
guage (but which Fletcher omits), in which he states:
It is scarcely necessary to note by way of reservation that the
significance of the decision on the question of guilt by the inves-
tigator and procurator, on the one hand, and by the court, on
the other, is different, since a positive answer by the investigator
or procurator on the question of guilt has only procedural con-
sequences, while a positive answer by the court is accompanied
by a very important material consequence-assignment of
punishment." 8
Polianskii, writing in 1956, found the presumption of innocence
to derive from the provision in the 1936 U.S.S.R. Constitution on
the "right to defense," '114 which clearly applied at the trial stage, and
on Article 326 of the 1923 Russian Criminal Procedure Code, which
required acquittal if insufficient evidence were presented at trial.""
Polianskii thus found the presumption to operate at trial.
In a 1949 article, Polianskii made it clear that the presumption
prohibits attributing evidentiary weight to the indictment:
The presumption of innocence is directed against preconcep-
tions, against a one-sided approach in evaluating the circum-
stances of a case, against bias as result of circumstances taken as
proof of the guilt of the accused without placing them against
other circumstances that cast doubt on the evidentiary signifi-
cance of the former." 6
Thus, in Polianskii's view, the presumption of innocence cautions
the court not to accept incriminating facts in the indictment at face
112. The term is po-svoemu.
113. N. POLIANSKII, supra note 109, at 188. "Procedural consequences" means that the
only significance of the procurator's decision is that it moves the case to court. Fletcher cites V.
Arsen'ev as "agreeing" with Polianskii that the investigator "decides" the question of guilt,
citing V. Arsen'ev, VOPROSY OBSHCHEI TEORI SUDEBNYKH DOKAZATEL'STV [IssuEs IN THE
GENERAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE] 134 (1964). However, Arsen'ev also makes it
clear that the decisions made at various stages are different "in their extent" and that the
decisions by the investigator and procurator have procedural consequences only. Id.
114. N. POLIANSKII, supra note 109, at 185.
115. N. POLIANSKII, supra note 109, at 185. See to same effect Polianskii, K Voprosu o
Prezumptsii Nevinovnosti v Sovetskom Ugolovnom Protsesse [The Issue of the Presumption of
Innocence in Soviet Criminal Procedure], in SOVETSKOE GosuDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET
STATE AND LAW] 57, 59 (No. 9, 1949). See also for disagreement with Fletcher's reading of
Polianskii, Berman & Quigley, supra note 21, at 1237-38.
116. Polianskii, supra note 115, at 63-64.
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value.
The issue of the evidentiary weight of the indictment is more
difficult in Soviet law than in most other legal systems, since accord-
ing to the prevailing view, the procurator must be "convinced" of
guilt before endorsing the indictment."" This standard is higher
than the probable cause standard used in other countries. A high
standard for indictment is desirable if the objective is to keep the
innocent from being placed on trial. But it makes it more difficult to
presume the accused innocent at trial." 8
Nonetheless, Soviet scholarship today uniformly holds that the
indictment carries no evidential weight at trial. "The conviction of
the investigator and of the procurator who endorsed the indictment,
does not mean that the accused is really guilty and that the presump-
tion of innocence no longer functions. '"" ' The fact that the procura-
tor is certain as to guilt "is not a feasible basis for a final conclusion
as to guilt."' 0 "For the court an indictment confirmed by a procura-
tor," states one scholar, "is only a basis for discussing the question of
putting the accused on trial."'' "The conclusion contained in the
indictment," writes another,
and the file of the preliminary investigation, which are studied
by the judges, cannot but give them a certain impression about
the case . . . .This being so, the presumption of innocence is
one guarantee that the court will approach objectively and with-
out preconceptions its examination and evaluation of the facts
and its checking of the file of the preliminary investigation. '"2'
Furthermore, a 1966 procuracy treatise on evidence states:
the conviction of the procurator (and investigator) about the
guilt of the accused does not mean that the accused is really
117. N. POLIANSKII, supra note 109, at 187. TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71,
at 442. V. LUKASHEVICH, supra note 11, at 52. Libus, The Presumption of Innocence and the
Termination of Criminal Cases (Acquittal), supra note 38, at 62. Criminal procedure legisla-
tion, curiously, does not specify the standard to govern the procurator's decision to endorse an
indictment. See RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 214(1) (stating only that
procurator is to endorse if "bases exist to send the case to court"). W. BUTLER, supra note 10,
at 316.
118. Martynchik, supra note 44, at 78-79, 83.
119. Petrukhin, supra note 18, at 21.
120. Libus, The Presumption of Innocence and the Termination of Criminal Cases
(Acquittal), supra note 38, at 62.
121. A. LARIN, supra note 19, at 35. Trial judges "must operate on the basis of the
presumption of innocence," states one author, "despite the conclusion of the investigator and
procurator that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond doubt." V. LUKASHEVICH,
supra note 11, at 55.
122. IAKUB, supra note 21, at 120.
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guilty and that the presumption of innocence is inoperative with
respect to him. The conclusions of the indictment must be veri-
fied by the court, which is also governed by the presumption of
innocence. 28
G. Other Aspects of the Presumption of Innocence
Some Soviet scholars find ramifications of the presumption of
innocence even beyond the confines of criminal procedure law.124
Some would apply it to a broader range of pretrial matters than
indicated by the Supreme Court. 2 ' That approach is consistent with
the historic origin of the presumption of innocence in Continental
law. The presumption first appeared there in France's Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen as a pretrial protection.' 26 More
rigorous application of the presumption at the pretrial stage could
significantly impact on Soviet procedure, particularly as regards
right to counsel and pretrial incarceration. Soviet suspects in most
situations are entitled to counsel only after the investigation has been
completed, 2 " and a high percentage are denied release pending
trial.' 28
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN PRACTICE
Judges are criticized by Soviet defense attorneys for discriminat-
ing against them in trials. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Court has con-
firmed their perception. The Court in 1986 called on judges "to stop
showing disrespect for the defense in criminal cases."' 29
Many Soviet jurists are concerned that judges do not place the
presumption of innocence into practice, and that they convict on in-
sufficient evidence. A 1982-1983 survey of 305 judges found that
forty percent disagreed with the statement: "It is better to acquit ten
guilty persons than to convict one innocent person," a question
123. TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at at 442.
124. E.g., a prohibition against eviction from an apartment or dismissal from a job,
negative pretrial publicity. A. LARIN, supra note 19, at 38-44.
125. E.g., decisions about pretrial incarceration, decisions to charge and to indict are to
be made with awareness of the presumption of innocence. IAKUB, supra note 21, at 119.
TEORIIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at 439-43. Kasumov, supra note 10, at 81-83.
126. Berman, supra note 4, at 622.
127. See supra note 68.
128. Pretrial confinement is authorized for a large number of serious offenses on the
basis of the seriousness of the offense alone, without a need for a finding that the accused is
likely to escape or obstruct the investigation if released. RUSSIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
art. 96 (1960).
129. Decree No. 15, supra note 64, at 8.
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designed by the surveyors to express in "polemical form" the issue of
presumption of innocence."' In another survey, 200 Moscow defense
attorneys were asked whether in the year 1985 they had represented
a client they believed innocent who was found guilty at trial. Eighty-
three percent said they had.1"' A survey of Soviet defense attorneys
who emigrated to the West elicited similar answers.132
Many Soviet defense attorneys say that judges are often unwill-
ing to acquit innocent defendants. They say that in the mid-1960's
there developed "an increase in bias towards the prosecution" on the
part of trial judges. "There were departures from the principle of
construing doubts in favor of the accused, not-guilty judgments have
practically 'died out,' and criminal repression has increased."' 33
The Chief Justice of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court, V. I. Ter-
ebilov, echoed these sentiments in a 1986 speech decrying the fre-
quency with which courts unjustifiably convict the accused. He said
that trial judges questioned about dubious guilty verdicts reply that
"it is a matter of evaluating," or "the evidence in the case was con-
tradictory," or "the evidence in the case was lost as result of poor
conduct of the preliminary investigation." 3 Terebilov asked why, in
such situations, the court's doubts are construed not in favor of the
defendant, but in favor of the accusation. There exists, Terebilov
complained,
a presumption of innocence. It is written into our statutes and
into explanations of the plenary session of the U.S.S.R. Su-
preme Court.' In the theory of criminal law it is generally
recognized that all doubts as to whether the accusation was
proved, if they cannot be eliminated, are construed in favor of
130. The survey was of 105 chief judges of large rural people's courts throughout the
USSR, of 131 chief judges of people's courts in the Russian and Ukrainian republics, and of
sixty-nine appellate judges. Reznik, Advokat: Prestizh Professii [The Advocate: Prestige of the
Profession], in ADVOKATURA tSOVREMENNOST', supra note 3, at 57, 61-62.
131. Reznik, supra note 130, at 62-63. The surveyor acknowledges possible bias and
self-interest in these responses.
132. Peter H. Solomon, The Case of the Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms and the
Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice 16 (Working Paper No. 28, Soviet Interview Project, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Jan. 1987).
133. Reznik, supra note 130, at 60.
134. XXVII S'ezd KPSS i Zdachi po Sovershenstvovaniiu Sudebnoi Deiatel'nosti:
Doklad Predsedatelia Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR V. L Terebilova na Plenume Verkhovnogo
Suda SSSR ot 16 Aprelia 1986 g. [The 27th Congress of the CPSU and Tasks to Improve
Court Work: Report of the Chair of the Supreme Court of the USSR V. I. Terebilov at the
Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR, April 16, 1986], BIULLETEN'
VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the USSR] 4, 6 (No. 3, 1986).
135. An evident reference to 1978 Decree, supra note 34. Terebilov evidently means
that a presumption of innocence is implied in statutes since it is not stated expressly.
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the defendant. But for certain judges all this is still not clear.'"
Judge Terebilov said elsewhere that many trial judges who re-
alize they should not convict, but who are reluctant to acquit, send
the case back to the procurator for additional investigation. He said
that there are only several hundred acquittals per year in Soviet
courts.13 7 The U.S.S.R. Supreme Court has called for "elimination
of the practice that has developed in some courts of remanding cases
for additional investigation when evidence is lacking to confirm the
accusation and all possibilities for getting additional evidence have
been exhausted. Under such circumstances the court is obliged to
enter an acquittal." 3 The Court also called for "elimination from
court practice of unjustified conviction, which is a serious violation of
socialist legality that infringes the rights of citizens and undermines
respect for the system of justice."'3 9
Even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union has criticized trial judges for bias. In 1986, that body
called for an end "to a preconceived, tendentious approach in crimi-
nal inquiry, preliminary investigation, and court trials, to delay, and
to a hardened indifference to the fate of people."' 4 The Party Con-
ference held in 1988 called for closer following of the presumption of
innocence and criticized "prosecutorial bias" in the courts. 4 '
Terebilov also criticized judges for convicting on the basis of the
investigator's file by giving substantial evidential weight to the in-
dictment. 4 Terebilov's predecessor, A. F. Gorkin, stated that some
judges simply "stamp the indictment."' 4 Terebilov said that many
judges do not scrutinize evidence where the defendant has confessed,
although under the criminal procedure statute, a confession must be
136. Terebilov, supra note 134.
137. Interview of V. I. Terebilov on Moscow Television program entitled Pravosudie i
Sovest' [Administration of Justice and Conscience], Jan. 23, 1987, 7:40 to 8:40 p.m. Moscow
time.
138. Decree No. 15, supra note 64, at 9-10.
139. Decree No. 15, supra note 64, at 9.
140. Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 0 dal'neishem
Ukreplenii Sotsialisticheskoi Zakonnosti i Pravoporiadka, Usilenii Okhrany Pray i Zakon-
nykh Interesov Grazhdan [On Further Strengthening of Socialist Legality and Legal Order
and on Improving the Protection of Rights and Legal Interests of Citizens], Pravda, Nov. 30,
1986, at 1. The Pravda text is close to a verbatim text of the Central Committee decision.
141. Rezoliutsii XIX Vsesoiuznoi Konferentsii KPSS: 0 Pravovoi Reforme [Resolutions
of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: On Legal Reform], Izvestiia, July 5, 1988, at
3, col. 1.
142. Terebilov, supra note 137.
143. Quoted in A. LARIN, supra note 19, at 75, and characterized as "serious violation
of presumption of innocence."
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confirmed by the totality of the evidence."
V. CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
Even though a presumption of innocence was not expressly
stated in the 1958-1960 criminal procedure codes, or in the 1977
Constitution, many Soviet jurists have continued to call for such an
explicit provision. " 5 Their aim is to pressure trial judges to be more
impartial in assessing evidence. The Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party now stands firmly behind the jurists in this endeavor.
Terebilov gave several explanations for the tendency of judges
to convict on less than sufficient evidence. Some judges are not "suffi-
ciently principled" or lack "civic courage." In some cases "lack of
objectivity is the result of the influence of officials, or a consequence
of the artificial fanning of public opinion by the press or by other
means.'" The Supreme Court put the onus on judges to resist
outside interference, calling on them "to cut off any attempts at in-
terference in the resolution of specific court cases and to ask appro-
priate agencies to call such officials to strict account." 7 The Central
Committee instructed Party agencies not to try to influence judges on
specific court cases.'"
The problem of Party interference is seen as two-sided. Weaker
judges, it is argued, are more likely to follow improper suggestions of
Party officials. Until recently, judges were elected in general elec-
tions for a term of five years.'" They were renominated by local
Party officials, hence their dependence on them. In order to reduce
judges' dependence on local Party officials, the Supreme Soviet in
1988 increased judicial terms with nomination at a higher level.' 5 '
VI. INSTITUTIONAL FORCES IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The presumption of innocence has played a major role in the
U.S.S.R. in efforts since the 1940's to improve legal safeguards for
the accused in the criminal process. The presumption in the 1940's
144. Terebilov, supra note 137. RussIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (1960), art. 77.
145. Savitskii, supra note 3, at 25. Petrukhin, supra note 18, at 25. Libus, The Pre-
sumption of Innocence in Soviet Criminal Procedure, supra note 38, at 56-58. Strogovich,
supra note 38, at 73.
146. Terebilov, supra note 134, at 6.
147. Decree No. 15, supra note 64, at 9.
148. Central Committee, supra note 140.
149. USSR CONST., art. 152.
150. Id. (as amended Dec. 1, 1988 (terms of ten years)).
[Vol. 29
SOVIET PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
and 1950's was a rallying cry for better rights protection. Currently,
it continues to play a similar role. Those advocating explicit incorpo-
ration of the presumption in legislation evidently find in it what
Fletcher calls its "rhetorical function." '51 They think that if the
criminal procedure code's language explicitly states "presumption of
innocence," trial judges are likely to be fairer to the accused, even if
such a legislative statement would not add measurably to the many
individual current legislative provisions that incorporate aspects of
the presumption.
The institutional forces at work in the discussion of the pre-
sumption shed light on the presumption's real or desired function in
Soviet law. Fletcher finds it to be, as indicated, a struggle between
the courts (supporting the presumption) and the procuracy (opposing
it). In a 1968 article, George Ginsburgs also saw a struggle, but he
found it to be between the legal professionals (as champions of judi-
cial independence supporting the presumption) and "the Party bu-
reaucrats (who, through the procuracy, want to retain direct control
of the judicial process)."' 2
The fact that the 1958-1960 criminal procedure codes effec-
tively accepted the presumption would seem to blunt the sharpness of
either perceived struggle.' 53 Incorporation of the presumption by the
Supreme Court in 1978 would seem to blunt it further still. More-
over, in 1986 the Communist Party condemned judges for bias
against the accused.' 5 4 With both the Supreme Court and the Com-
munist Party exhorting trial judges to be more fair, it is hard to see
the judges as the champions of the presumption and the Communist
Party as its opponent. Furthermore, the procuracy appears to sup-
port the presumption. 55
There are certainly some jurists in the U.S.S.R. who promote
the presumption of innocence more strongly than others. This is true
among academics, judges, and even defense attorneys. But no clear
institutional lines on the issue can be drawn.
VII. LESSONS FROM THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE
The presumption of innocence is viewed by the U.S.S.R. Su-
151. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1213-14.
152. Ginsburgs, The Political Undercurrents of the Legal Dialogue, 15 UCLA L. REV.
1226 (1968).
153. Berman & Quigley, supra note 21, at 1232-33.
154. See supra notes 140 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., TEORtIA DOKAZATEL'STV, supra note 71, at 436 (this treatise, prepared
under Procuracy auspices, supports the presumption).
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preme Court and by Soviet scholars as playing a broad role in ensur-
ing fairness in criminal trials. They read into the presumption more
than is generally attributed to it in other countries. Both common
law and other civil law jurisdictions typically find in the presump-
tion prohibitions against (1) according evidential weight to the in-
dictment, (2) placing proof burdens on the accused, (3) convicting on
other than a high standard of proof, and (4) convicting where it is
not clear that the proof standard has been met.1"6
However, the Soviet approach finds in the presumption of inno-
cence certain safeguards for the accused not found in the presump-
tion as understood in common law countries. The Soviet approach
includes, for example, a prohibition against admissibility at trial of
illegally obtained evidence.15 This is an issue that in common law
countries has not been linked to the presumption, although in the
United States, at least, there is protection against admissibility of il-
legally obtained evidence."" 8 It also includes broad discovery rights
for the accused,159 rights broader than those found in common law
countries. 6 It further includes a right to have guilt determined
through evidence-taking, even after the accused has pled guilty.161 In
common law countries such evidence-taking is also required, but is
typically perfunctory." 2 The Soviet presumption also includes the
right to appeal from a conviction."' Common law jurisdictions nor-
mally provide one appeal as of right, but the United States Supreme
Court has held that a convicted person does not have a constitutional
right to an appeal. 64
In Soviet law the presumption of innocence prohibits imposition
of proof burdens on the accused, even for defenses. In common law
jurisdictions, the accused bears the burden of persuasion on many
156. Patarin, supra note 2, at 14-24. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 530.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
158. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (relying on prohibition against unlawful
searches).
159. See supra note 69.
160. In the United States statutory rights of discovery vary by state and typically include
the right to be informed about certain incriminating evidence. An accused in the United States
has a constitutional right to pretrial disclosure of exculpatory information in the prosecution's
possession, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), but not of incriminating information
that will be used at trial. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 555 (1977).
161. See supra text accompanying note 73.
162. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 states that "[tihe court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea
of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea."
163. See supra text accompanying note 98-102.
164. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, (1894); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
393 (1985).
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defenses."' In common law jurisdictions the accused also bears the
burden of production on certain defenses. In Soviet procedure, the
rules on burden of proof, incorporated within the presumption, do
not allow even that burden..66
Finally, with the issuance of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court's
1978 decree, the presumption of innocence became constitutionalized
in Soviet law. The United States Supreme Court has never found the
presumption constitutionally required, though it has found in the
United States Constitution important elements of the presumption,
namely rules on standard of proof'8 7 and burden of proof.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Currently, there is little controversy in the Soviet Union over
the legal status or scope of the presumption of innocence. The pre-
sumption appears solidly established as a matter of constitutional
law, though it is not expressed explicitly in legislation. Current dis-
cussion of the presumption in the U.S.S.R. relates less to theoretical
aspects than to practical aspects. The presumption is viewed as a
useful educational device to convince judges to conduct trials fairly.
In Soviet law the presumption of innocence encompasses a wide
variety of norms protecting the accused. This broad meaning of the
presumption holds potential lessons for common law jurisdictions.
165. See supra note 75.
166. Strogovich, supra note 53, at 270 (noting that Vyshinskii disagreed with this view);
Arsen'ev, supra note 113, at 68 (in Soviet procedure accused is "not obliged even to mention
his sources of evidence," but state investigator and court are obliged to investigate the issue).
167. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
168. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1974); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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